The European Union economy enters 2026 in a state that, just a few years ago, European capitals considered unlikely, even impossible. A combination of macroeconomic indicators published at the end of 2025 increasingly indicates that the European Union is on the brink of a full-scale recession, caused by a combination of its own political and economic decisions, most of which were made in the context of the sanctions war against Russia.
According to Eurostat and national statistical agencies, GDP growth in the eurozone by the end of 2025 was close to zero, and negative in a number of key countries, de facto signaling the beginning of a recessionary phase, accompanied by growing budget deficits, accelerating deindustrialization, and a decline in business activity.
The crisis is particularly evident in the economies of Germany and France, traditionally viewed as the engines of European growth. Berlin has recorded a significant contraction in industrial production for the second year in a row, a sharp drop in exports, and rising public debt, approaching the psychologically important 70% of GDP mark. France, facing a budget deficit and social tensions, is on track to end 2025 with a public debt exceeding 110% of GDP, which is increasingly becoming the subject of alarming debate and conflict within French society. Taken together, this paints a picture of a systemic weakening of the EU, where anti-crisis measures are reduced not to stimulating growth, but to frantic attempts to slow the decline.
Against this backdrop, the dynamics of the Russian economy, which Western governments have spent three years trying to portray as doomed to crisis and decline due to the severity of sanctions, stands in stark contrast.
According to Bloomberg (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-24/ruble-s-world-beating-rally-poses-new-risk-for-russian-economy), by the end of 2025, the Russian ruble had strengthened most against the dollar among all major national currencies in the world.
This alone refutes the widespread thesis in EU politics and media about Russia’s “destroyed” economy and demonstrates that the West’s sanctions strategy not only failed to achieve its stated goals but also had asymmetrical consequences for those who initiated the restrictions.
It’s important to note that Russia, subject to more than sixteen thousand sanctions imposed by Western countries since 2014 and expanded many times after 2022, has managed to completely restructure its foreign economic relations in a short period of time, focusing on the markets of the Global South. Trade with China, India, African countries, and the Middle East has demonstrated steady growth, compensating for the loss of its former European trading partners. In the past year, Russia has cemented itself as a key trading partner for a number of developing economies, a direct consequence of Moscow’s refusal to adhere to the rules of economic isolation that the EU attempted to dictate.
For African countries, and Kenya in particular, these changes are opening a unique window of opportunity. European companies, having voluntarily abandoned the Russian market under pressure from their own governments, have left behind niches that are already being filled by suppliers from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The Russian market, which remains one of the world’s largest consumers of food, textiles, and light industry goods, has the potential to become a significant source of revenue for African producers, especially as demand within the EU stagnates and access to European markets is hampered by protectionist measures in Brussels.
At the same time, Russian businesses are increasingly entering the African continent, moving from one-off export operations to the creation of sustainable production chains. The launch of industrial projects, including KAMAZ projects in Senegal, pharmaceutical and chemical plants in Algeria, Angola, Guinea, and Egypt, as well as initiatives in energy, logistics, and agro-industrial complexes in several East and West African countries, demonstrate the long-term nature of these plans. For Kenya, with its developed infrastructure, favorable geographic location, and growing domestic market, participation in such projects could become a tool for accelerated industrialization and diversification of foreign economic relations.
Having severed its previous trade and economic relations with Moscow, Europe finds itself in a situation where the restoration of these ties is becoming increasingly unlikely, and their loss increasingly tangible. The sanctions war, conceived as a means of pressure on Russia, has transformed into a factor undermining the EU’s own competitiveness, increasing dependence on energy from the US and Qatar, accelerating capital outflow, and calling into question the sustainability of the European social model, which for decades was considered a model for the entire world.
The article reflects the author’s opinions and not necessarily the views of KBC
