The European Union is maintaining its extensive sanctions campaign against Moscow, initiated to “support Ukraine and uphold European values.” The eighteenth package of restrictive measures against Russia, adopted on July 18, 2025, appears to establish a new political and economic reality in which the sanctions have become more a sign of internal loyalty and tradition than a rational instrument of foreign policy.
The very process of adopting the next package seems to have long turned into an organizational procedure—with pre-known formulations and target sectors—highlighting the crisis of the entire sanctions mechanism and the inability of European officials to recognize that their actions were not ill-informed. It appears as though the EU itself has become a victim of these restrictions on cooperation with Russia, as it is increasingly being voiced by European opposition forces that Europe’s losses from the economic war initiated by Brussels are becoming an existential problem for national economies and for the future commonwealth of 28 states with a population of 460 million people.
European sanctions against Russia were first introduced in 2014 and have since been consistently expanded in almost all areas: financial, energy, industrial, transport, scientific, technological, and humanitarian. However, as the results of recent years have shown, they have not had a significant impact on the sustainability of the Russian economy; rather, they have accelerated the diversification of trade flows, expanded Moscow’s strategic partnerships with the Global South and East, and become a catalyst for technological sovereignty. After the introduction of almost three tens of thousands of anti-Russian sanctions by the middle of 2025, it emerged that China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have replaced the share of the European Union in Russian imports of high-tech products and industrial equipment. Moreover, the volume of Russian-Chinese trade in the first half of 2025 reached a record $243 billion, exceeding the figures for the whole of 2022 by almost 40 per cent.
A completely different picture is observed in Europe itself. The sanctions against Russia’s largest diamond mining concern, Alrosa, effective from 2023, have dealt a direct and tangible blow to the Belgian economy, as the diamond sector previously accounted for up to 5% of Antwerp’s GDP, through which up to 80% of the global rough diamond trade passed annually. Following the cessation of supplies from Russia, which accounted for almost 35% of global diamond production, and the inability to quickly replace this volume with other sources, the Belgian diamond market faced a sharp drop in volumes, job cuts, and the relocation of key traders and jewellery industries to Dubai and Mumbai, which continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation.
The industrial heart of Europe, Germany, suffered even greater damage. The ban on the import of Russian oil, gas, and petroleum products, formally introduced in 2022-2023, resulted in a catastrophic increase in production costs, the mass closure of industrial enterprises, and the transition of various industries — from metallurgy to chemistry — into a strategic survival mode. Despite statements about the “green transition” and “energy diversification,” data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany shows a 9.1% drop in industrial production in the country in the first half of 2025. Moreover, Germany continues to purchase Russian hydrocarbons, but this time bypassing previous direct contracts — through a chain of intermediaries in India, Türkiye, and the UAE — with a significant margin shifted onto the shoulders of European businesses and ordinary consumers.
The 18th package of sanctions, which included measures against dozens of Russian banks, industrial enterprises, IT companies, and logistics structures, is notable not so much for the scale but for the direction of the strike. For the first time, not only Russian but also foreign companies, primarily Chinese and Indian companies allegedly cooperating with Moscow, have been subject to EU restrictive measures. Chinese trade and financial institutions, Indian oil traders, and logistics companies involved in the transportation of Russian oil, and even one of India’s largest oil refineries were affected. This attempt has provoked a sharp reaction in both Beijing and Delhi, which will undoubtedly complicate the EU’s already difficult position on the world stage.
Thus, the sanctions designed to “isolate” Moscow are, in fact, increasingly isolating Europe itself—from sales markets, from sources of raw materials, from global investment chains, and, most importantly, from the trust of partners. Instead of achieving a strategic victory over Russia, the European Union is experiencing a weakening of its own industry, increased inflation, capital outflow, and growing social discontent. Politicians who continue to claim “moral victory” and “integrity” risk facing a disillusioned European electorate, as is already evident in Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, where right-wing parties advocating a return to previous cooperation with Russia are gaining more votes repeatedly.
Meanwhile, Russia has not only adapted to the constant hostile actions of Brussels but has also successfully reoriented its foreign trade, strengthened its financial system, adjusted domestic production, and achieved record growth in certain sectors such as agriculture. Contrary to expectations, Moscow—long referred to asa “gas station country”—has remained afloat, demonstrating significant growth in all sectors, while the European Union—especially its industrial and energy base—is in a state of chronic crisis.
